CPU LOAD BASED THREAT PREVENTION FRAMEWORK FOR COVERT CHANNEL ATTACKS

Main Article Content

Kunchala Little Flower, Dr.Neeraj Sharma

Abstract

Numerous virtual machines on a solitary virtual machine mon-itor are segregated
from one another. A malignant client on one virtual machine ordinarily can't hand-off
restricted information to other virtual machines without utilizing unequivocal correspondence
media like shared les or an organization. In any case, this detachment is undermined by
correspondence in which CPU load is utilized as a secretive channel. Sadly, this danger has
not been completely perceived or assessed. In this review, we quanti-tatively assess the
danger of CPU-based secret channels between virtual machines on the Xen hypervisor. We
have created CCCV, a framework that makes a clandestine channel and conveys information
subtly utilizing CPU loads. CCCV comprises of two client processes, a sender and a
beneficiary. The sender runs on one virtual machine, and the beneficiary sudden spikes in
demand for one more virtual machine on the equivalent hypervisor. We measured the transfer
speed and correspondence precision of the incognito channel. CCCV imparted 64-bit
information with a 100% achievement rate in an optimal climate, and with a success pace of
more than 90% in a climate where Web servers are handling demands on other virtual
machines.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Metrics

Metrics Loading ...

Article Details

How to Cite
Kunchala Little Flower, Dr.Neeraj Sharma. (2021). CPU LOAD BASED THREAT PREVENTION FRAMEWORK FOR COVERT CHANNEL ATTACKS. Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education (TURCOMAT), 11(2), 866–878. https://doi.org/10.17762/turcomat.v11i2.11626
Section
Research Articles