

## The Ottoman Parliament Discussions for the Italian occupation of Libya (1911-1912) Between Democracy and Dictatorship

Assist. Prof. Dr. Nadia Yaseen Abed

Department of History, College of Arts, University of Baghdad-Iraq  
Email: [nadiyasseen@coart.uobaghdad.edu.iq](mailto:nadiyasseen@coart.uobaghdad.edu.iq)

**Article History:** Received: 11 January 2021; Revised: 12 February 2021; Accepted: 27 March 2021; Published online: 10 May 2021

### Abstract

After the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) Revolution of 1908 and the successful reintroduction of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, the Unionists began to hold parliamentary elections, which were held in accordance with the electoral law issued by the Parliament in 1877 within the first constitutional experiment in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1878, and was restored Published on September 20, 1908. After the elections the Unionists were able to settle it in their favor by winning the majority of seats in the Parliament in its first legislative session in 1908-1912.

The Parliament began its sessions on December 17, 1908 at a difficult time in the history of the Ottoman Empire internally and externally. One of the most important things faced by the Ottoman Empire was the Italian invasion on Libya, which began on September 29, 1911. The issue dominated the discussions of the Parliament as soon as its sessions resumed on October 14, 1911. Tripoli deputies put the issue for discussing in a manner consistent with the scale of the event, demanding that the Ottoman ministry be tried for treason for wasting an important part of the state's territory. The deputies in the Parliament interacted, in general, with this demand and accused the government of negligence and failure to provide the requirements to defend Libya. The subject of the invasion Italy over Libya dominated on the remainder of the first legislative session and extended even to the second legislative session, which opened in April 1912.

Through this paper, we are trying to find out the nature of the discussions in the Parliament regarding the Italian occupation of Libya, Could the deputies speak freely and present their ideas as they want? What is the position of the Arab deputies? Who was the one who had the highest word in the Ottoman decision? the Parliament or the Government? And other questions that help to come up with a vision of whether the Parliament was democratic or not.

### Introduction

After the revolution led by CUP, at the beginning of July 1908, the Unionists succeeded in imposing the reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution promulgated in 1876 after a moratorium that lasted more than thirty<sup>1</sup> year, when the Ottoman newspapers published on the morning of Friday, July 24, 1908, the Royal reinstates the constitution and call for elections (Aqdam, July 24, 1908; Waugh, 1930, p. 110; Nalbandoğlu, 1950, s.41).

The Unionists chose to adopt the same constitution (the Basic Law) that was established in the first constitutional phase<sup>2</sup> in the Ottoman Empire 1877-1878, and it was re-published in September 1908, and under the constitution two bodies were formed to form what is known as the National Assembly, the first being the Senate (*Ayan*). The appointment of its members from the Sultan, and the second was the Parliament (*Mebusan*), which is elective for deputies of the Ottoman Empire (Basic Law, 1908, pp. 9-15).

The members of the Parliament were elected in two Stages. All Ottoman males who were at least twenty-five years old participated in the first phase to elect the second phase voters, one person for every 500 to 750 people, and these in turn elected the Parliament deputies according to the specified number for each election constituency (Abu Mirz, 2017, p.66; Tunaya, 1996, s.87)

<sup>1</sup> The constitution was declared for the first time in the Ottoman Empire on December 23, 1876, and many internal and external circumstances contributed to its declaration, and the Parliament opened its sessions on March 19, 1877, and its sessions did not exceed one year, as the Parliament was dissolved on February 14, 1878 by order of Sultan Abed Al-Hamid II (1876 - 1909) (according to the authority granted by the constitution to him, and the constitution was suspended, thus ending the first constitutional phase in the life of the Ottoman Empire.( Abed, 2014, pp. 90-95; Ibrahim, 2018, pp. 61-107; Devereux, 1963)

<sup>2</sup>A number of sources tend to use the word *Meşrutiyet*, which is the word that was used in the Ottoman Empire to refer to the constitution.

The elections were held in November and December of 1908 in an atmosphere enjoyed by the Unionists with great popularity in light of their slogans of freedom, brotherhood and equality, and even though the elections resulted in the Parliament, the Unionists were not a predominant component of it, but the Parliament members were generally those who had the acceptance and support of the CUP. Also, they were the supporters (Moanis, September 2007, pp. 375-376, 381-382; Abed, 2014, pp. 388-389; Turfan, 2000, p. 151.)

Despite the influence that the CUP enjoyed within the Parliament, organized opposition soon began to grow within the council in light of the political events that took place in Istanbul and the rapid change of ministries<sup>3</sup>, and the disagreement over many issues that were discussed within the corridors of the Parliament, and most importantly that disagreement over the central political approach that the Unionists sought to impose in the Ottoman Empire in return for the opposition rejecting this approach to decentralization. The political process in the Ottoman Empire witnessed the formation of many parties that took on the character of the opposition, to some extent, for CUP, the most prominent of which was the Moderate Liberal Party, which was established in November 1909, and the Arabs had a leading role in it, and soon this party merged with another that was more open. In its opposition character is the Liberty and Entente Party, which was founded at the end of 1911 (Berro, 1960, pp. 251- 300). The parliamentary mass in its support and opposition to the government, had an active role in discussing many of the issues that the Ottoman Empire went through in its last years, perhaps the most prominent of which was the Italian occupation of Libya.

#### **- Italian occupation of Libya**

After achieving its unity in 1861, Italy tried to have a place in the colonial race among European countries, and since the end of the nineteenth century it has sought to strengthen its economic and cultural links with Libya, so the Bank of Rome began to set its sights on Libya since 1905, and officially opened a branch in Tripoli. In the West in April 1907, the bank soon established branches and commercial agencies affiliated with it in a number of Libyan cities, and its activities extended to the agricultural and industrial fields in Libya (Malgieri, 1978, pp. 17-24; Al-Hadlrah, 2004, pp. 38-41).

Italy intended to pave the way for the direct occupation of Libya by preparing Italian public opinion through a media campaign accompanied by an active diplomatic effort with France, Britain, Russia, Germany and Austria to win their support or at least their neutrality (Khaylah, 2010, pp. 32-52; Al-Asadi, September 2013, pp.406--414). After the colonial bargaining succeeded, completed its military readiness, and prepared Italy to achieve international support through its war fleet (Bazma, 1965, pp. 39-44), was addressed two protest notes to the Ottoman government on the twenty-third and twenty-fifth of September 1911 claiming that the security of its citizens in Libya was endangered, and demanding the removal of the Ottoman forces from Libya and granting Italy wide powers in Libya (Khaylah, 2010, p. 54). Without waiting for the Ottoman response to its two memos, Italy initiated an ultimatum to the Ottoman government, which was received by the Grand Ibrahim Hakki Basha<sup>4</sup> on the twenty-eighth of September 1911, in which they gave twenty-four hours time to respond, and claimed that the Ottoman government obstructed the interests of Italians in Libya and threatened the security of its citizens and the security of Italy itself, and criticized the weakness of the regime in Libya and the failure of the Ottoman government to achieve security and progress in it (Malgieri, 1978, pp. 466--468).

The Italian ultimatum was a shock to Basha, whose government was not prepared, in light of all the internal and external problems facing the Ottoman Empire<sup>5</sup>, to enter into an outright war with Italy, as he was aware that the Ottoman Empire would be the loser in any confrontation with Italy. He

---

<sup>3</sup> During the first year of the constitutional government's life only, the cabinet was changed five times.

<sup>4</sup> An Ottoman politician, born in 1836, studied law and mastered English and French, he started his career in the Sublime Porte, and moved between many tasks and positions, and in 1908 he became Minister of Knowledge, then Grand Vizier. He has many books on history and law, and he died in 1918.

<sup>5</sup> The Ottoman Empire witnessed during the first years of the life of many internal problems and disturbances, some of which were external interventions, perhaps the most prominent of which was the movement of Imam Yahya in Yemen, the Druze in Hawran, many disturbances in the Balkans, especially serious tension in Albania that prompted Sultan Muhammad V to Take a tour there to pacifying the situation.

expressed his concern to one of those close to him, saying: **"It is a problem that must be solved in twenty-four hours. Either we leave a great mandate or enter a battle with unknown consequences, and the outcome of which may be a disaster. We were expelled from Algeria, Tunisia, and finally from Egypt, and now another place will be lost (Tripoli). The meaning of the war with Italy is to give it the opportunity to destroy the coast of Libya"** (Quoted from: Al-Hadhlah, 2004, p. 51).

Hakki Basha was quick to present the ultimatum to the Ottoman Sultan Muhammad V (1909-1918) and to the Senate Speaker Said Basha, who expressed his opinion that "If we knew that neither war nor surrender was possible, could a compromise be found between war and surrender" (Quoted from: Al-Hadhlah, 2004, p.52), which inspired Haqqi Basha to work to find such a solution, and his first steps were the Ottoman response to the Italian warning, weak and somewhat flawed, through which he sought to appease the Italian government, as it charged the Ottoman government with the responsibility of retreating in Libya to the governments. The former denied any tendency on its part to obstruct Italian interests in Libya, and expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Italian government and offer them oil concessions and economic facilities in Libya (Malgieri, 1978, pp. 469 - 471).

Despite the concessions contained in the Ottoman government's response, the Italian government refused to accept this response and declared war on the Ottoman Empire on the twenty-ninth of September 1911, and its fleet appeared on the same day in front of the city of Tripoli demanding that it hand over the city within twenty-four hours, and on the third of October it began. Indeed, the city was bombed, and due to the Ottoman forces decision to withdraw to the interior regions, the Italian forces managed to occupy the city within about a week, while their military operations continued to occupy the rest of the Libyan cities, especially Benghazi (McCulla, 1991, pp.87-100; Rushdy, 1953, p.152; Al-Hudalah, 2004, pp. 62-70).

On the other hand, the Ottoman forces, with their modest capabilities and limited weapons, were not able to confront the Italian forces in the face of reality, and this was the most important reason for the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces, in the face of the Italian maritime superiority in the Mediterranean and the inability of the Ottoman government to move its forces in it, and the most prominent thing that the Ottoman government did was coordination with the forces. And sending an elite of its best officers, such as the famous officer Anwar, one of the leaders of the Federal Trio, and Mustafa Kemal, who later took over the leadership of modern Turkey, to Libya, to take over the leadership of the resistance forces there (Notes of Anwar Basha, 1979; Al-Hadhlah, 2004, pp.70- 76, 84-88). As a result of the victories achieved by Italy and the retreat of the Ottoman position, Grand Vizier initiated his resignation and assigned Saeed Basha to form the ministry instead of him. The Parliament was also invited to convene to discuss the Italian occupation of Tripoli.

#### **- Calling the Parliament to convene on October 14, 1911**

The events of the war took place at a time when the Ottoman Parliament, was enjoying its annual leave under the constitution, which began at the beginning of the month of June, and was scheduled to last until the fourteenth of November to start the fourth year of the first session of the Council, and days after Italy declared war. Summoning the two chambers to meet on the fourteenth of October 1911, that is, about a month before the date of its session, to discuss the new conditions.

It was natural for the issue of the Italian invasion of Libya to dominate the atmosphere of the Council of the two envoys, which was evident since the Sultan's speech in which he opened the first meeting of the Council on the fourteenth of October, in which he clarified the conditions of warning and the declaration of war by Italy and its invasion of Tripoli and Benghazi, stressing that **"Italians did not look at our legitimate rights, and did not respect the customs of our people... and that the Ottoman state, on the one hand, would like the continuation of world peace, and on the other hand, would like to implement justice and advancement according to the principles of conditionality and complete the causes of civilization as allowed by time and capabilities... and I am assured of what can be done. An effort, whether from the government and the council, or from the whole people"**(Kuloglu, 2012, p.350).

After the sermon of the Sultan, the deputies of Tripoli, Sadiq bin al-Hajj and Mahmoud Naji Bey submitted a report to the Council of the two envoys, in which they held the responsibility for the events in Tripoli for Hakki Basha and his ministries, stressing that the Italian invasion was in a Muslim country in which there is no one who belongs to another religion, and there is no one among

the Libyans who refuses or He objects to the Ottoman sovereignty, and they accused the Haqqi government in their report of not paying attention to strengthening the regular forces in the region despite its knowledge of Italy's colonial intentions in Libya, and the more so that the government of Haqqi Basha sent most of the forces present in Libya to Yemen <sup>6</sup>, until the number of forces in Libya decreased From about forty thousand to less than five thousand, and did not give any interest in arming the existing forces, as the report emphasized the economic problems and administrative negligence that the region suffers from, and they concluded the report with " **The government left Western Tripoli and Benghazi, the legacy of my Ottoman ancestors, unable to defend in every way! left them without soldiers, weapons, ammunition, officers, no commanders, no supplies, or money, left them hungry and poor!!... and Tripoli's deputies are demanding pursuant to Article 31 of the Basic Law<sup>7</sup> to trial of the Ministry of Haqqi Basha to redeem the homeland in the future from its destruction.** (Al-Manar, November 1911, pp.862-867; Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 10 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), s.66-70).

Most of the deputies in the Parliament agreed with this proposition, holding the government responsible for failing to preserve the lands of the Ottoman Empire and not providing the basics for preserving them. On the stage of the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, 1876 - 1909, by saying: "**Italy invaded Western Tripoli to seize it, and there is no reason for that... We were subjected to this disaster because we did not have a fleet, we did not think at any time that a state is in this breadth It should have had a strong fleet, but this is not our fault, but rather it is the mistake of the previous long-term era... Our fleet was comparable to the Italian fleet during the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz, then Sultan Abdul Hamid came to eliminate the fleet completely**" (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.24). They stressed that Western Tripoli cannot be helped because the state's maritime forces are weak, and instead it is possible to strike Italian interests in the Ottoman Empire (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.24).

According to the basic law of the Ottoman state, the report of the deputies of Tripoli was transferred to a special committee to study it before it was discussed in the parliament. Nevertheless, the Libyan issue remained dominant in most of the council's discussions. When the Grand Sadr Saeed Basha attended a program and referred it to the Parliament to gain confidence, he emphasized that the question of Western Tripoli It comes at the forefront of the government's foreign policy tasks, stressing the importance of preserving the interests of the Ottoman state and its relations with other countries and the need to walk "**in the way of supporting and achieving peace**" (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 5 Teşrinievvel 1327,s.21).

The debate in the Parliament about the government program intensified between supporters and opponents, as Mr. Ahmed Maher, Deputy of Kastamonu, defended the position of the government of Hakki Basha and Said Basha, stressing the difficulty of controlling the coasts of Tripoli, which extend to hundreds of miles and the need for huge funds to build its fortifications, and concluded that he wanted "**A ministry that preserves the rights and interests of the people and the state, in real and real terms**", and expressed his readiness to approve the ministry and give it confidence. (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.28-29). Emanuel Karasu Efendi, deputy of Selanik, also called for the need to quickly form a government to enter discussions to solve the problem of Western Tripoli (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.33). On the other hand, Mr. Ismail Sidqi, deputy of Aydin, expressed his regret when he arrived in Western Tripoli and held the government of Hakki Basha responsible for what happened, and criticized the new government program by adopting political methods, explaining that there are no activities on the ground that prove the government's sincerity or seriousness. He continues his work in Istanbul, and the Italians' movement is still in it naturally and with full freedom, and all that the government has done is to seek help from foreign countries, announcing his refusal to grant confidence to this ministry, and asking the rest of the deputies to take the same position (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel

---

<sup>6</sup> The Ottoman government took this step after the outbreak of a revolutionary movement in Yemen against Ottoman rule, which began in 1910 and continued until the peace was concluded in 1911( Abaza, 1986, pp. 245-299).

<sup>7</sup> The article stipulates that if a deputy wants to file a complaint against a minister in his area of responsibility, according to the bylaws of the parliament, the matter must be transferred to a special committee that studies the report submitted within three days. On it. (Basic Law, 1908, pp. 7-8)

1327, s.31-32). While another deputy inquired about information he received from a reliable source, according to his description, regarding Mahmoud Shawkat <sup>8</sup>, who continued in the same position in the new ministry, directing his orders to stop the resistance and the forces retreating inside (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.34).

These objections were not welcomed by Grand Vizier Saeed Basha , who did not hide his annoyance at them by saying that "**Freedom of speech is one of the foundations of conditionality... and freedom of speech is guaranteed in this council... but every freedom has its limits**" (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.34). He stressed the sensitivity of the situation and the importance of expediting the selection of the new ministry's personnel. In response to some of the objections raised, he explained that the government has stopped construction at the Italian embassy in Istanbul, evicted Italian journalists, and has also returned those coming from Italy and refused to present an entry visa to any Italian. Grand Vizier denied issuing any orders from the previous ministry to surrender and stop the resistance, explaining that the government has two options, namely a military confrontation and a peaceful solution through diplomatic means, stressing the government's determination to follow the two paths to reach a conviction which is better, but at the same time he expressed his conviction. That the Ottoman Empire did not possess the war requirements, and that a peaceful solution is the best (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.34-38).

This proposal was raised by a number of deputies in the envoys' council, and the matter turned into an argument between him and Mr. Lotfi Fikry, Deputy of Dersim, known for his anti-government approach, who expressed his conviction that the government program is nothing more than an article, and declared his rejection of the options made by the government to confront the issue of Tripoli in the West, and considered it a sick and even harmful plan, and accused the government of not having do any actual action even if the Italian citizens are removed, and he stressed that if the government continues to deal with the situation in this way, Italy will settle in Tripoli, the West, and that "**The members of this ministry are not the individuals in whom we place the hope to save us from this disaster ... I am with A group of my colleagues state that we withhold confidence from the ministry**"( Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.40-41).

Grand Vizier did not hide his resentment at the words of Mr. Lotfi Fikri, despite this, he commented on all the points he raised, and stressed that the program described in the article is fully applicable contents within a short time, and that, in light of the circumstances that the Ottoman Empire is going through and the war with Italy It is important to form the government quickly, and the decision is in the hands of the deputies in the House of Envoys, who have the right to adopt confidence or not (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.41-43). Here, the head of the Parliament decided to end the debate, and a vote of confidence was given to the government (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.43-44).

#### **- The intensification of the war discussions with Italy in the Parliament ends with its dissolution**

The war with Italy and the situation in Libya remained a constant concern of the Parliament, until there were among the deputies a call not to discuss and discuss any issue other than the war, because "now our only concern should be the war," according to Mr. Kirkor Zohrap Efendi, Istanbul's deputy (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 10 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.78). Another deputy affirmed that "**The nation is in war status and its people are busy day and night in finding reasons for resistance**" It is ridiculous that That the deputies be preoccupied with any matters other than war, such as the law to encourage industry, which was proposed for discussion, or something else (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 10 , Trinievvel 1327, s.79). Mr. Moufid asked Izmit deputy to stop being preoccupied with any issues other than the main issue represented by the situation in Libya for which the meeting was held for him (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 10 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.78).

---

<sup>8</sup> He was born in 1857 from a Baghdad family, graduated from the military college in Istanbul, and received many military positions, visited a number of European countries, including France and Germany, and rose to the military rank and arrived in 1905 to the rank of first lieutenant general and was appointed to the same six as a governor of Kosovo And commander of the Third Army after his participation in the elimination of the incident of March 31, 1909, he became Minister of Forces in 1910, then Grand Vizier was issued in January 1913, and remained in his position until his assassination in the middle of the same year. (Al Douri, March 2009, pp. 329-339).

Although all the deputies agreed that the first concern should be on the situation in the Western Tripoli, especially in light of the weakness of the resistance and the return of the Ottoman forces in front of the Italian forces, a number of deputies demanded that the situation be dealt with in cold blood and running the affairs of the state (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 10 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.80). In general, the situation in Libya had, within at least the first stage, a kind of unitary influence within the ranks of the Parliament, which was part of a more general case in Ottoman public opinion, as the unjustified Italian aggression against Libya led to the mobilization of all Muslims in the Ottoman Empire to defend the Islamic Caliphate. In Libya, the expression of support was overwhelming throughout the Ottoman Empire. In Iraq, clerics issued a fatwa for jihad, and thousands of tribesmen in Iraq and Syria took the initiative to volunteer to participate in the defense of Libya (Al-Azzawi, August 2015, pp. 523-529). Fundraising campaigns to support the Ottoman forces in various parts of the country, especially Baghdad, Medina, Akka and Tripoli Levant (Al-Azzawi, August 2015, p. 5; Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 5 Teşrinisani 1327, s.466; and 13 Teşrinisani 1327, s.40). Driven by their religious and national feelings, and by everything that was published in the Arab press about the inhuman and arrogant behavior of the Italians against the Libyans (Kilani, 1996), the donations reached amounts that actually covered a large part of the state's needs under conditions of war, as evidenced by the discussions in the Parliament (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 14 Teşrinisani 1327, s.76). The Parliament was overflowed with telegraphs supporting the Ottoman Empire in the confrontation with an Italian (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 13 Teşrinisani 1327, s.40-41).

In this atmosphere, the voices rose among many deputies of the Parliament to unify the ranks, and everyone agreed to send a letter of denunciation to the parliaments of the major countries to inform them of the Italian aggression against Libya and all the abuses that Italy committed there, and received note in the Telegraph showed "**The government of Italy attacked Western Tripoli, which is part of the Ottoman Empire, and violated all civil laws and the rules of state's rights, so it took families of civilians and students, arrested volunteers and treated them as prisoners of war according to the Hague Convention, considered them disobedient and killed them, as it killed defenseless women and children. It was exposed to worshipers in mosques in a manner that is contrary to humanity and civil. The Parliament condemns these actions and draws the attention of all peace-loving people and the entire civilized world, and they ask to inform them of the councils in your countries**(Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 27 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.335). The Parliament also unanimously approved two decisions regarding the first regarding securing the salaries of the deputies of Tripoli and Benghazi who remained in Libya within the resistance forces, and the second regarding securing study seats for Libyan students whose schools were closed in Libya, which found a quick response from the government, and the Council also approved financial allocations in the budget. For war purposes (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 15 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.135).

All these developments did not prevent the growing opposition within the Parliament, taking advantage of the same conditions of war that gathered the ranks. A number of deputies demanded to pose a question to the government about“ everything that is happening in Western Tripoli and what is happening in it ”and about the government's actions in this regard (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 19 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.205 and 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.286). For this purpose, the foreign minister, Mr. Asim, was hosted in the Parliament on November 8, 1911, who referred to the horrific Italian practices in Libya, And that "Ottoman blood is poured out unlawfully in Western Tripoli (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.286-287). Indicating that the government contacted all the ambassadors of the Ottoman Empire in order to send a denunciation and condemnation to the countries in which they represent about everything Italy is doing in Libya, and also letters were sent to the countries participating in the second The Hague Conference<sup>9</sup> and defamation of the injustices committed by the Italians against the people in Libya, showing that the violence will end thanks to these measures and the assistance of foreign countries (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.287).

---

<sup>9</sup> This conference was held in 1907 after the first Hague conference held in 1899, and the two conferences aimed to set up a structure for settling international disputes. The 1907 conference concluded an agreement on respecting the laws and customs of land war.

This answer was not convincing to the government's defenders and opponents alike. One of the deputies inquired whether the measures taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the governments to which it belongs, would remain a denunciation? Another deputy called for accountability for all those who **"Making Western Tripoli in this situation"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.287). For two days, the government was present in the Parliament in an attempt to curb the opposition, and the Minister of War, Mahmoud Shawkat, was subjected to harsh criticism, especially since he was also the Minister of War in the previous ministry, As soon as he spoke about the extent of his preoccupation with the war and its necessities, the deputy of Hama, Abdul Hamid Al-Zahrawi, interrupted him by saying that **"the opposition does not believe you"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.290). Al-Sham Deputy Mr. Shafiq Al-Moayad added that **"you were supposed to be busy at the time and not now"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.291). Referring to the time of the Italian attack on Libya, on the other hand, Mahmoud Shawkat made it clear that the report presented by the deputies on Western Tripoli **"From beginning to end it is an attack on military actions, and for me personally... There was not a single iota of negligence or negligence on the issue of Tripoli"** He stressed that if people hear his explanations, they will share with him the conviction that he was not a party to any negligence (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.294).

Mahmoud Shawkat pushed Lotfi Fikry to accuse him, in a long speech, that he **"wants to make himself a model for all the military forces, that you are not an example of the military"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.301). He explained that when the question of Western Tripoli appeared, there were no preparations, despite the many warnings, and it became clear that the Ottoman Empire did not possess any capabilities to defend itself, adding, **"If what is required is a tyrannical government for the safety of the state and the homeland, it calls for silence about every illegal movement, and not No sound is issued, and the surroundings become as if it is the quietness of the graves, we must admit that we are mixing the papers... But if we want to leave the calm of the graves, and go back to the rule of conditionality and organize them above all, then you must excuse the hustle and screaming we are doing. Something without screaming, and we won't stop until we get to the water"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s302). Voices rose among the opposition within the envoys' council in support of what Lotfi Fikry proposed and accused Mahmoud Shawkat of his desire to restore dictatorial rule in the state, which prompted the Grand Vizier to argue to defend his ministry in general, and Mahmoud Shawkat in particular, in an atmosphere dominated by the democratic character of the proposition And the discussions and an attempt to absorb the opposition on the part of the Grand Vizier and his ministers, who were clearly not comfortable with everything that was raised against them (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327, s.302-324).

Many deputies in the Parliament continued to demand to know the reasons for what happened in Libya, from that report presented by Asaad Basha , which the Parliament decided to convert into a complaint form, in which he demanded the government to reveal the reasons for reducing the number of forces in Western Tripoli and the government's lack of interest in its equipment, equipment and supplies. And also why the government did not pay attention to the many warnings it received from the Ottoman ambassador in Rome about Italy's desire to occupy Libya, but it did not even try to reinforce its forces there, and what is the reason why it did not try to repel the enemy from the sea and chose the defensive situation and the withdrawal of forces inward (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 13 Teşrinisani 1327, s.44-45).

The voices of the opposition increased, especially on the part of Arab deputies, following the spread of news about the advance of the Italian forces in Libya, and the criticism began to become more harsh against the government regarding the weakness of its procedures and its military backwardness, and a number of neutral deputies tried to bring the deputies from the CUP and the deputies from the party Freedom and the coalition to strengthen the government's position in the face of war conditions, and also to confront the spread of news about the government's intention to give permission for the envoys' council or to dissolve it, but this attempt did not produce a tangible result, and opposition and criticism of the government continued to escalate, so the deputy Abdul Hamid Al-Zahrawi declared that **"the country's deficit has been evident, as it cannot send an army, supplies, or supplies... After the loss of Western Tripoli today, tomorrow we will lose our Syria, our Hijaz, our Iraq and others... The deputy in the Parliament means representing this vanquished**

**nation at its command... Western Tripoli Get lost... and we cannot even submit an inquiry to the government, we were told not to disturb the government"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 27 Kanunuevvel 1327, s.400-405). And within the same meaning, the deputy of Sinop, Ridha Nour, said during a long discussion with the federates in the parliament, **"They say that since we are in a state of war, the Parliament will bother the government"** asking **"why the government is afraid from the parliament"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 28 Kanunuevvel 1327, s.436). Explaining his concerns that the government wants to disrupt the Parliament and abandon Libya, concerns that shared by many deputies. The criticism extended to the Parliament itself, so the deputy of Hama, Mr. Khaled Al-Barazi, criticized him for not taking any effective decision against the Italian invasion of Libya, explaining his perception that they had **"only adopted the ministry, as if our meeting was just to give confidence to the ministry"** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 2 Kanunusani 1327, s.533).

On the other hand, the government stated, according to the Minister of Education, that there is a big rift between the Parliament and the government, and with the continuation of this dispute, the government will remain in crisis and the council is weak and disrupted, which is a situation that must be changed.

It was clear that the government could no longer deal with the opposition in the parliament. Moreover, the unionists began to clearly notice their decline in popularity, which was evident during the by-elections that took place in Istanbul after the death of one of its deputies, and which a member of the Freedom and Coalition won with a result. 197 votes to 196 (Kayali, 1997, p.86). The government came to the conviction that the best solution to the situation is to dissolve Parliament, and for this purpose the Grand Vizier proposed to the Parliament to amend Article 35 by restoring it to its original position that was mentioned in the 1876 Constitution, which gives the Sultan the authority to dissolve the parliament, after he restricted this right to obtaining the approval of the Senate according The amendment of the article on August 28, 1909, despite the great controversy that arose over this proposal and its rejection by the opposition deputies, the government succeeded in getting a lot of votes but failed to pass it due to not obtaining a two-thirds majority (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 3 Kanunuevvel 1327, s. 203-216; 5 Kanunuevvel 1327, s.219; and 28 Kanunuevvel 1327, s. 522-371).

The Unionists insisted on dissolving the parliament, and they decided to pass it through the Senate, which held a meeting on January 16, during which it agreed to dissolve the Parliament by a majority of 39 votes to 5 votes only. On this basis, the Sultan issued, under pressure from the Unionists, a will to dissolve the council in the 18th session of January 1912, in which it was decided, according to Article 7 of the Basic Law and with the approval of the Senate, to dissolve the Council of the two envoys. Provided that the new body of deputies be convened and his election will take place within three months (Turfan, 2000, pp. 176-171).

#### **- The New Parliament and the Peace Treaty with Italy**

The victory of the Freedom Party and the Coalition in the by-elections in December 1911, even if it was by one vote, was a wake-up call for the federates who were convinced of the importance of limiting the opposition if they wanted to preserve their position in power, so they were keen to obtain the majority in the elections to be held, And they were basically possessing authoritarian, organizational and material capabilities that their competitors did not possess, yet they used all means to achieve their goal, whether persuasion or coercion, enticement or intimidation. Some have called it the big stick elections (Dumon & Giorgio, 1993, p. 280; Kayali, 1997, pp.88-89.) The issue of the Italian occupation of Libya was strongly present in the propaganda for these elections, so the coalitions held the Unionists responsible for what happened in Libya, and launched a strong campaign against them in this regard, among the Arabs in particular. On the other hand, the Unionists were concerned about the decline of their influence due to the events in Libya, and to counter this, they tried to use an Islamic Ottoman discourse to beautify their image among the Muslims. However, the development of events proved that the Unionists's concerns about this issue were not correct. On the contrary, as the defeats in Libya resulted in an increase in the ability of the federates to mobilize support instead of increasing the opposition, the war moved to the Syrian coasts at the height of the electoral campaign in February, when the forces came The Italian attacking the eastern shores of the Mediterranean in an attempt to pressure the Ottoman government to make concessions in Libya, the unionists helped to exploit the resulting panic in affirming the unity of ranks against foreign aggression (Kayali, 1997, pp.86- 89), The mass rally condemned the Italian aggression and called for



the unity of Muslims to succeed in confronting it. 89) (Kayali, 1997, pp. 86). The British ambassador to Istanbul summarized the popular position by saying:

**“The opinion is general that the Committee will prove victorious. As they are the only party of any strength it is recognized that their success is desirable in the interests of the country....Should they be defeated a fresh impetus will be given to the disruptive forces and perhaps fresh encouragement to its neighbors without, as in any case an opposition majority could only be a very small one”** (Kayali, 1997, p.89).

The elections for the Parliament took place in April 1912 and the Unionists achieved an overwhelming majority, and only six of the two hundred and eighty-four deputies won from the opposition ((Dumon & Giorgio, 1993, p.280). And only a fifth of the deputies of the old council were re-elected (Kayali, 1997, p.89).

After a long disagreement and debate, the new council came back as completing the first electoral cycle, which had one year left, and the council held its first session on April 18, 1912, with a word from the Sultan, the bulk of which was specific to Libya, so he said **“The war was started by the Italian government unlawfully and in contravention of all international covenants and covenants, and despite the desires of many parties to start peace talks, we are continuing the war, but we undoubtedly desire some kind of reconciliation, but this reconciliation must be preserving our rights to rule. Actual full. Our soldiers, land and sea forces are with the mujahideen, our brave Arab sons, doing what they can to preserve the rights of the nation with determination and valor ”** (Quoted: Kuloglu, 2012, pp. 617-618).

It is clear from the speech of the throne that the government wants to conclude peace with Italy, and for this it began talks with Italy since November 1911, and Italy sought to pressure the Ottoman state to obtain what it wanted by attacking the Ottoman islands in the Aegean at the same time the Council was held (Khaylah, 2010, p. 77).

One of the most prominent activities of the new council was the closing of a page that had opened in the first session of the old council, represented by accusing Haqqi Basha’s government of negligence and demanding an investigation with him (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 16 Mayıs 1328, s.134-137).

The method of dissolving the council and the sultan’s speech at the opening of the new council and the nature of its activities conveyed to the Arab deputies perceptions of the government’s intentions regarding Libya, which made them speak in a strong way with the council’s members, In a note sent by the deputy of Western Tripoli, Suleiman Al-Barouni to the Parliament, he wrote, **“If you embark on reconciliation, what will remain for you to confront the free countries, the eastern world and the Islamic countries in particular... Even if you leave, based on the pride and victories of Sultan Ottoman and Muhammad Al-Fateh, we will continue to defend Until we conquer the enemy and harass him, until our last breath and obtain the honor of martyrdom”** ( Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 28 Mayıs 1328, s. 240). As for Hama’s deputy, Mr. Khaled Al-Barazi, he addressed the envoys’ council, saying: **“Today, negotiations are taking place in political forums to conclude a political peace... that is very far, even if you get a decree for this. I say in the name of all Arabs that we will wipe this treaty or The firman, and that this will not happen even if there remains one Arab individual, and even if all our blood is shed”**( Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 19 Haziran 1328, s. 613).

Many deputies agreed with this proposition, and demanded that the government clarify to them the truth of what is happening, so the Supreme Leader tried to explain the military reality of the Ottoman and Italian sides, and confirmed the existence of the talks on reconciliation, but stressed that it must be on sound terms that preserve the rights of the caliphate in Western Tripoli and Benghazi. Italy provides material compensation, confirming Italy’s readiness to conclude a peace treaty (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 2 Temmuz 1328, s.315-320). The Foreign Minister continued what Grand Vizier started, stressing that **“the war lasted for a long time, and that this war, as one of them said, ended when it began, and if it is true, we will shed tears in exchange for the wasted blood”** (Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 2 Temmuz 1328, s.321).

The words of the Grand Leader and his Foreign Minister was confronted with applause inside the Parliament supporting the government. Although the largest number among the members of the Parliament was in favor of the government, the reality of the government was very fragile, and the behavior of the Unionists during the elections reflected its lack of confidence in its popularity and

weight in the Ottoman street, which prompted the army to intervene again in politics through a group formed Within his ranks of the army officers it called itself (Saviour Officers Group), demanding the resignation of the government and the departure of the unionists from it. That the situation was resolved caused an exacerbation until the government was paralyzed, and the Grand Vizier was forced to resign on the ninth of July 1912. Ghazi Ahmad Mukhtar Basha<sup>10</sup> took over in his place on the twenty-first of the same month, and expelled all Unionists from his government (Turfan, 2000, pp.179-184; Lewis, 1968, p. 224).

This did not end the situation, as the rescue officers demanded the dissolution of the Parliament because it did not represent the nation, and they sent a threatening telegram to the council's chairman. They also sent a telegram to the Sultan asking him to dissolve the envoys' council and hold new elections. On August 3, 1912, a threat in the form of a warning was sent to The Parliament stated that if the council was not dissolved, the army would march within days to Istanbul, and in view of these developments the ministry met with the Senate and decided to dissolve the council, and a royal decree was issued to that effect on the fifth of August 1912 (Turfan, 2000,pp.185-187).

After these problems at home and the increase in external problems, and the beginning of the Balkan warfare, the government sought to resolve the conflict with Italy to face the new problems, and reconciliation with Italy was signed according to the Treaty of Ouchy on the fifteenth of October 1912, under which the Ottoman Empire recognized Italy's control of Libya while retaining The Sultan with his spiritual authority over the Muslims there as the Caliph of the Muslims (Al-Akkad, 1970, pp. 15-16). Thus, the presence of the Ottoman Empire in the African continent ended in an attempt to preserve what was left of its lands in Europe, and the resistance of Italy left to the people of the country to deal a major blow to the position of the Ottoman Empire in the hearts of Arab Muslims, and an important stage in the decline of trust and the cracking of relations between the Arab and Turkish elements in the Ottoman state .

### **Conclusion**

The Italian occupation of Libya caused a great shock in the Ottoman Empire, and although the military measures taken were of little use, the state rushed to invite the Parliament from its vacation to discuss the situation.

The discussions took place in a clear atmosphere of democracy, whether between the deputies themselves or between the deputies and the government, and the war with Italy and its developments was among the most prominent reasons for the growth of opposition within the Ottoman Parliament that reached the point of division within the Parliament between a group supporting the government and another opposition, joined by most Arab deputies In the Parliament, and another group chose neutrality. The opposition adopted the position of rejecting any attempt at reconciliation with Italy in a way that did not guarantee the protection of Ottoman sovereignty over Libya and was able to mobilize Ottoman public opinion, especially among Muslims, against the government that was inclined to seek peace and not escalate the war with Italy, and the government could not deal with the opposition or prove The correctness of its position and chose to impose its will by dissolving the parliament. This constituted an important turning point in the direction of the Unionists towards dictatorship in government.

The Unionists used various legal and illegal means in the elections for the new parliament, so they came with a formal one that agreed with all the government demands, which was the reason for the re-intervention of the army in political life and the dissolution of the Parliament in August 1912, which was not reconstituted until May 1914, during this period The Ottoman government ended the war with Italy by abandoning Libya and all its presence on the African continent, forcing its will without returning to the Parliament, ignoring all the slogans it showed about constitutional rule, and

---

<sup>10</sup> An Ottoman politician and military, born in Bursa in 1839, then moved to Istanbul to complete his studies at the Military Academy. He participated in the elimination of many rebellions and movements in the Ottoman Empire. In 1873 he was appointed a governor of Yemen, and he was appointed governor of Crete in 1876. In the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877 - 1878, from which he obtained the title of Ghazi, in 1912 he held the position of Grand Vizier and soon resigned from him due to the loss in the Balkan wars, he died in 1918. (Al-Resalah, 18 June 1934; Turfan, 2000, p. 184).

its position was one of the main reasons for the loss of confidence between it and the Arab component in the Ottoman state.

#### **References**

1. Abu Mirz, Ibtisam, 2017, "Two Decisive Years in the Rule of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1909," MA Thesis, Birzeit University, Palestine.
2. Berro, Tawfiq Ali, 1960, *Arabs and Turks in the Ottoman Constitutional Era 1908-1914*, Dar Al-Hana Press, Cairo
3. -Abaza, Farouk Othman, 1986, *Ottoman rule in Yemen 1872-1918*, Egyptian General Book Authority, Egypt.
4. -Abed, Nadia Yaseen, 2014, *The Unionists. A historical study of their social roots and ideological theses in the late nineteenth century - 1908*, Adnan House and Library, Baghdad.
5. -Al-Akkad, Salah, 1970, *Contemporary Libya*, Institute for Arab Research and Studies, Cairo.
6. -Al-Asadi, Salam Muhammad Ali Hamzah, September 2013, "The Italian Invasion of Libya 1911 Between International Settlements and Military Preparedness 1878-1911 Historical and Analytical Study", *Journal of the College of Basic Education - University of Babylon*, Issue 13, pp. 406-414.
7. -Al-Douri, Ismail Nuri, March 2009, "Mahmoud Shawkat, the deception of the CUP Group in the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, *Tikrit University for Human Sciences Journal*, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp. 328-374.
8. Al-Hadla, Raghad Salih, 2004, "The Libyan Resistance to the Italian Occupation 1911-1922", an unpublished master's thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, Iraq.
9. Al-Manar (magazine), Egypt, Volume 14, Part 11, November 1911.
10. -Al-Risalah (magazine), Egypt, No. 50, dated June 18, 1934.
11. -Bazmeh, Muhammad Mustafa, 1965, *Aggression or War between Italy and Turkey in Libya, Part One*, Ferjani Library, Tripoli, Libya.
12. -Devereux, R, 1963, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
13. -Dumon, Paul, & Giorgio, Francois, 1993, "The Death of an Empire 1908-1923", *History of the Ottoman Empire, Part Two*, supervised by Robert Mantran, translated by Bashir al-Sebaei, Cairo, pp. 243-350.
14. -Al-Azzawi, Rana Salim, August 2015, "The Fatwa of Jihad for the Religious Reference in Najaf Against the Italian Colonialism in Libya in 1911", *Journal of the College of Basic Education for Educational and Human Sciences / University of Babylon*, No. 22, pp. 523-530.
15. -Eqdam (newspaper), Istanbul, Un Bashenji Sunna, Numro 5087, July 24, 1908.
16. -Ibrahim, Nagham Khalil, 2018, "The Constitutional Experience in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1914 Historical Study", unpublished MA Thesis, College of Arts, University of Baghdad, Iraq.
17. -Kayali, Hasan, 1997, *Arabs and the Young Turks. Ottoman Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908- 1918*, University of California Press, London.
18. Khaylah, Sami Hashem, 2010, "The Position of European Countries on the Italian-Libyan War 1911-1912," an unpublished PhD thesis, St. Clement University, Iraq.
19. -Kilani, Muhammad Sayed, 1996, *the Italian invasion of Libya and the articles that I wrote about in the Egyptian newspapers between 1911 - 1917*, Dar Al-Ferjani, Cairo.
20. -Kuloglu, Orkhan Saadallah, 2012, *Libya and the Libyans in the Ottoman Parliament*, translated by Abdul Karim Omar Abu Shweireb, The Libyan Center for Archives, Libya.
21. -Lewis, B.,1968, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, London.
22. -Malgieri, Francesco, 1978, *The Libyan War 1911-1912*, translated by Wehbe Al-Bouri, Arab Book House, Libya.
23. -McCulla, Francis, 1991, *Italy's War for the Sahara, Observations of the British War Messenger with the Italians in Tripoli*, translated by Abd al-Mawla Salih al-Harir, Libyan Jihad Center for Historical Studies, Tripoli.
24. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 10 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Beşinci İnikad.

25. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 13 Teşrinisani 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Yirminci İnikad.
26. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 14 Teşrinisani 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Yirmibirinci İnikad.
27. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 15 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Yedinci İnikad.
28. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 16 Mayıs 1328 (1912), Devre.2, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.1, Sekizinci İnikad.
29. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 19 Haziran 1328 (1912), Devre.2, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.1, Sekizinci İnikad.
30. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 19 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Dokuzuncu İnikad.
31. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 2 Kanunusani 1328 (1912), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Otuzsekizinci İnikad.
32. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 2 Temmuz 1328 (1912), Devre.2, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.1, Otuzçüncü İnikad.
33. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 26 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Onikinci İnikad.
34. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 27 Kanunuevvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Otuzdördüncü İnikad.
35. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 28 Kanunuevvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Otuzikiinci İnikad.
36. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 28 Mayıs 1328 (1912), Devre.2, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.1, Onikinci İnikad.
37. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 3 Kanunuevvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Yermibeşinci İnikad.
38. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 5 Kanunuevvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.2, İçtima Senesi.4, Yirmialtinci İnikad.
39. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 5 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Üçüncü İnikad.
40. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 5 Teşrinisani 1327 (1911) Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Onyedinci İnikad.
41. -Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridasi, 6 Teşrinievvel 1327 (1911), Devre.1, Cilt.1, İçtima Senesi.4, Dördüncü İnikad.
42. -Moanis, Ashraf Muhammad Abd al-Rahman, September 2007, “Arab deputies in the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul 1326-1333 AH/ 1908-1914 CE”, Journal of Middle East Research, Cairo, Issue 21, 371-410.
43. -Nalbandoğlu, Fazıl, 1950, Demokrasi ve Rejimler Politikası, Ulus Basimevi, Ankara.
44. -Notes of Anwar Basha in Tripoli, War, 1979, translated by Abd al-Mawla Saleh Al-Harir, Center for Research and Studies of the Libyan Jihad, Libya.
45. -Rushdie, Rasim, 1953, Tripoli, the West in the Past and the Present, Second Edition, Dar Al-Nile for Printing, Tripoli.
46. -The Basic Law, 1908, Al-Adab Press, Beirut.
47. -Tunaya, Tarik Z., 1996, Hürriyetin İlânı İnkci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatına Bakışlar, İknci Bakşı, İstanbul bilgi universitesi yayınları, İstanbul.
48. -Turfan, M. Naim, 2000. Rise of The Young Turks Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse, I.B.Tauris, New York.
49. -Waugh, Sir Telford, 1930, Turkey Yesterday Today and Tomorrow, Chapman and Hall, London.