# Improving the security of the Knapsack Cryptosystem by using Legendre Symbol 

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#### Abstract

In this paper, we present a new cryptosystem based on combining the Knapsack cryptosystem with the Legendre symbol. This combination provides the Knapsack cryptosystem with the feature of using two different super-increasing sequences to generating the keys. The results show that the proposed cryptosystem is secure against the LLL algorithm and Shamir's attacks because it uses two different public keys instead of only one key as in the standard cryptosystem. Moreover, the comparison of the proposed cryptosystem with the standard cryptosystem confirms that using the Legendre symbol increases the decryption time in the proposed cryptosystem. The higher decryption time with the use of two different private keys increases the required time to break the cryptosystem if any possible attacks might exist that can be applied. Therefore, the proposed cryptosystem is more secure and highly effective.


Keywords: Knapsack cryptosystem, Legendre Symbol, public-key cryptosystem, super-increasing sequence, LLL Algorithm.

## 1. Introduction

Transmitting data through the internet or storing it in network computers has a high possibility of being visible to other people. This means the privacy and any other private online communications will be under a major threat of being used by unauthorized people. Therefore, to prevent the transmitted data from being used, cryptography is applied to convert the plaintext into ciphertext [1]. One type of cryptography is the public-key cryptosystems that use two different keys, public and private, to encrypt and decrypt data [1]. One of the earliest public-key cryptosystems is the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, which was invented by "Ralph erkle" and "Martin Hellman" in 1978, and it is based on using the "Subset Sum Problem" [2], [3]. Using subset problem in the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem was to make it complicated and hard to be hacked; however, in 1982 Adi Shamir [4]-[6] broke it. Several studies have been done to improve the security of this cryptosystem, for example, using modular knapsack formula [7], elliptic curve and shift knapsack problem [8], by establishing a new easy knapsack cryptosystem [9], using the fact of "Permutation Combination Algorithm" [10], by combining Chinese remainder theorem with the linear transformation of the secret sequences [11] and by converting knapsack cryptosystem to 3CNF [12].

This paper we proposes a secure version of the knapsack cryptosystem based on combining Legendre Symbol with the standard knapsack cryptosystem. The proposed cryptosystem is secure against the LLL algorithm and Shamir's attacks because of the used randomness based on using Legendre Symbol. Moreover, the comparison of the proposed and standard cryptosystems shows that the encryption and decryption times take longer compared to the standard cryptosystem. Increasing the decryption time means more time to break the system if there is any other possible attacks may be applied. Therefore, the results show that the proposed cryptosystem is secured and more efficient compared to the standard cryptosystem.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the Knapsack cryptosystem is discussed. In Section 3, Legendre Symbol is introduced with some basic definitions and theorems. In Section 4, the proposed cryptosystem has been presented. in Section 5, security analysis has been discussed. Finally, in Section 6 conclusions are provided in Section 6.

## 2. The Knapsack Cryptosystem

Definition1: A sequence $S_{n}=\left\{s_{n}\right\}_{n=0}^{N-1}$, where $s_{n} \in \mathbb{Z}^{+}$, is a super-increasing sequence iff, $s_{i}>$ $\sum_{j=0}^{i-1} s_{j}, \forall 0 \leq i \leq N-1$. [13] [14].

In order, for Alice and Bob to communicate using Knapsack Cryptosystem they need to follow the processes below [2].

## A) Generating the Keys Process

The process of generating the keys is done by Alice by following the steps below.

1) A super-increasing sequence, $S=\left\{s_{i}\right\}_{i=0}^{k}$ is chosen.
2) A number $n$ is chosen, such that, $n \geq \sum_{i}^{k} s_{i}$.
3) A number $u$ is selected, such that, $\operatorname{gcd}(u, n)=1$. Thus, $(S, n, u)$ is the private key, and it is kept secret.
4) $\quad q_{i}=u * s_{i}(\bmod n)$ is calculated, where $1 \leq i \leq k$, then the sequence $Q=\left\{q_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{k}$ is the public key, and it is published to be available for everyone.

## B) The Encryption Process

To encrypt the plaintext, Bob follows the steps below.

1) Bob converts each character of the plaintext to a binary form $b_{i}$ of length $k$ bits, where $1 \leq i \leq k$, then he writes them in a sequence $B=\left\{b_{i}\right\}_{i=0}^{k}$.
2) For each $b_{i}$, he calculates the corresponding expression $e n_{i}$ as

$$
e n_{i}=\sum_{j=1}^{k} q_{j} * b_{i j}
$$

Then, $E n=\left\{e n_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{k}$ is the ciphertext, and it is sent to Alice.

## C) The Decryption Process

After receiving the ciphertext, the decryption process is performed by Alice. This process requires knowing the private key $(S, n, u)$. Firstly, Alice needs to find the modular multiplicative inverse of $a$ modulo $n, u^{-1}$, by using the extended Euclidean Algorithm [13]. Then, she multiplies each term of $E n$ by $u^{-1}$ modulo $n$. That is,

$$
l_{i}=e n_{i} * u^{-1}(\bmod n)=\left(\sum_{j=1}^{k} q_{i} * b_{i j}\right) * u^{-1}(\bmod n)
$$

where $1 \leq i \leq k$. Then, subtracting the largest number in $S$, which is less than $l_{i}$, from $l_{i}$ and repeating the subtraction process until zero is obtained. Obtaining zero means $b_{i}$ is formed, which represents the binary form for the $i^{\text {th }}$ character in the plaintext.

## 3. Legendre Symbol

In this section, a brief introduction of Legendre Symbol is discussed, for more information see [13]-[16]
Definition 1: Let $a$ be an integer and $n$ be a positive integer, then $a$ is a quadratic residue modulo $n$ if $\operatorname{gcd}(a, n)=1$ and the congruence $x^{2} \equiv a(\bmod n)$ has a solution. If there is no solution, then $a$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo $n$.

Note 1: The only case when $x^{2} \equiv a(\bmod p)$ and $\operatorname{gcd}(a, p)=1$, where $p$ is an odd prime number, is considered in this paper.

Definition 2: If $p$ is an odd prime, $a$ is an integer and $\operatorname{gcd}(a, p)=1$, then the Legendre symbol $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$ is given as

$$
\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)=\left\{\begin{aligned}
1, & \text { if } a \text { is a quadratic residue; } \\
-1, & \text { if } a \text { is a quadratic nonresidue. }
\end{aligned}\right.
$$

Theorem 1: (Euler's criterion) Let $a$ be a positive integer and $p$ be an odd prime, such that, $\operatorname{gcd}(a, p)=1$. Then

$$
\left(\frac{a}{p}\right) \equiv a^{\frac{(p-1)}{2}}(\bmod p)
$$

Theorem 2: (Properties of Legendre Symbol) Let $p$ be an odd prime and $a$ and $b$ be positive integers, such that, $\operatorname{gcd}(a, p)=\operatorname{gcd}(b, p)=1$. Then, [14]
i. If $a \equiv b(\bmod p) \Longrightarrow\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$,
ii. $\quad\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)\left(\frac{b}{p}\right)=\left(\frac{a b}{p}\right)$,
iii. $\quad\left(\frac{a^{2}}{p}\right)=1$.

Theorem 3: Let $p$ an odd prime then,
i) $\quad\left(\frac{-1}{p}\right)=(-1)^{\frac{(p-1)}{2}}=\left\{\begin{array}{r}1, \text { if } p \equiv 1(\bmod 4) \text {; } \\ -1, \text { if } p \equiv 3(\bmod 4) \text {. }\end{array}\right.$
ii) $\quad\left(\frac{2}{p}\right)=(-1)^{\frac{\left(p^{2}-1\right)}{8}}=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}1, & \text { if } p \equiv 1 \text { or } 7(\bmod 8) ; \\ -1, & \text { if } p \equiv 3 \text { or } 5(\bmod 8) \text {. }\end{array}\right.$

Theorem 5: (The law of reciprocity) Let $p$ and $q$ be any two odd primes, then,

$$
\left(\frac{p}{q}\right)\left(\frac{q}{p}\right)=(-1)^{\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{2}}
$$

## 4. Proposal Algorithm

In the proposed algorithm, the Knapsack cryptosystem is used based on the value of the Legendre Symbol. Both Alice and Bob agree on choosing a secret large prime number $p$. Then the quadratic residues and quadratic nonresidues $a$ modulo $p$ are calculated and sorted randomly in a set by both of them. Because Legendre Symbol is either 1 or -1 , two separate processes to generate the keys are used instead of one as in the standard Knapsack cryptosystem. That is,

$$
\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)=\left\{\begin{align*}
1, & \text { Generating the Keys Process } 1 ;  \tag{1}\\
-1, & \text { Generating the Keys Process } 2
\end{align*}\right.
$$

The above formula is kept secret with Alice, and the public key 1 and public key 2 will be sent to Bod to use them based on Legendre symbol. Figure 1 below illustrates the proposed algorithm.


Figure 1: The figure illustrates the Proposed Algorithm
Now we will discuss a working example below using the proposed algorithm.
For simplicity, suppose Alice and Bob agreed on selecting $p=19$, and the agreed randomly sorted set of quadratic residues and quadratic nonresidues is given as $\{4,2,7,3,8,13,5, \cdots\}$. That is, the agreed corresponding set of Legendre symbol is $\{1,-1,1,-1,-1,-1,1, \cdots\}$.

## A) Generating the Keys Process

i) Process 1

Suppose that Alice generates $S_{1}=\{3,5,11,20,41\}$ and selects $n_{1}=85$ and $u_{1}=44$. Therefore, the first private key is $\left(S_{1}, n_{1}, u_{1}\right)$. By using the formula $q_{i}=u_{1} * s_{i}\left(\bmod n_{1}\right)$, the first public key is $Q_{1}=$ $\{47,50,59,30,19\}$.
ii) Process 2

Suppose that $S_{2}=\{2,3,7,13,27\}$ is generated by Alice. Also, she selects $n_{2}=60$ and $u_{2}=7$. Thus, the second private key is $\left(S_{2}, n_{2}, u_{2}\right)$. Using $q_{i}=u_{2} * s_{i}\left(\bmod n_{2}\right)$, the second public key is $Q_{2}=$ $\{14,21,49,31,9\}$.

## B) The Encryption Process

Suppose that Bob has the plaintext "Help" and would like to send it to Alice. Firstly, the plaintext is converted to a binary form. Secondly, Bob calculates $e n_{i}=\sum_{j=1}^{k} q_{j} * b_{i j}$ based on the resulting public key from using Formula (1), where the agreed set of Legendre symbol is $\{1,-1,1,-1,-1,-1,1, \cdots\}$. Table 1 below shows the encryption process.

Table 1: The table shows the encryption process

| The Alphabet |  |  |  |  |  | $b_{i}$ | $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$ | The used Public Key | $e n_{i}=\sum_{j=1}^{k} q_{j} * b_{i j}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| H | 0100 <br> 0 | 1 | $Q_{1}=\{47,50,59,30,19\}$ | 50 |  |  |  |  |  |
| E | 0010 <br> 1 | -1 | $Q_{2}=\{14,21,49,31,9\}$ | 58 |  |  |  |  |  |
| L | 0110 <br> 0 | 1 | $Q_{1}=\{47,50,59,30,19\}$ | 109 |  |  |  |  |  |
| P | 1000 <br> 0 | -1 | $Q_{2}=\{14,21,49,31,9\}$ | 14 |  |  |  |  |  |

Therefore, $E n=\{50,58,109,14\}$ is the ciphertext, and it is sent to Alice.

## C) The Decryption Process

When the ciphertext, $E n=\{50,58,109,14\}$ is received, then Formula (1) is applied by Alice. Alice firstly calculates the inverse of both $u_{1}$ modulo $n_{1}$ and $u_{2}$ modulo $n_{2}$
which are $u_{1}^{-1}=29$ and $u_{2}^{-1}=43$ respectively. Secondly, based on the agreed set of Legendre symbols, $\{1$, $-1,1,-1,-1,-1,1, \cdots\}$, Alice calculates $l_{i}=e n_{i} * u_{j}^{-1}\left(\bmod n_{j}\right)$, where $1 \leq j \leq 2,1 \leq i \leq k$. Then, $b_{i}$ is calculated by subtracting the largest term in $S_{j}$ from $l_{i}$ and by continuing the subtraction process with the rest of the terms in $S_{j}$. See Table 2 below.

Table 2: The table shows the decryption process

| $e n_{i}$ | $\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)$ | The used Process to <br> generate the Keys | $n_{j}$ | $u_{i}^{-1}$ | $l_{i}=e n_{i} * u_{j}^{-1}\left(\bmod n_{j}\right)$ | $b_{i}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5 <br> 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 29 | 5 | 01000 |
| 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 43 | 34 | 00101 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 29 | 16 | 01100 |
| 09 | 1 | $1^{-}$ | 2 | 0 | 43 | 2 |

Then,

$$
B=\{01000,00101,01100,10000\}
$$

Thus, the plaintext "Help" is obtained after converting $B$ back to the numerical form.

## 5. Security Analysis

The standard Knapsack cryptosystem can be easily broken by the LLL algorithm only by knowing the public keys and the ciphertext [17]. To recover the plaintext, the LLL algorithm is applied to the matrix

$$
\Upsilon=\left[\begin{array}{cc}
I_{k \times k} & 0_{1 \times k} \\
Q_{k \times 1} & -e n_{i}
\end{array}\right]_{k+1 \times k+1}, 1 \leq i \leq k
$$

Where, $I_{k \times k}$ is the identity matrix, $Q_{k \times 1}$ is the public key and $e n_{i}$ is the $i^{t h}$ element of the ciphertext [16]. However, the LLL algorithm cannot be applied to the matrix $\Upsilon$ to break the proposed cryptosystem because there are two different processes to generate the keys. These processes use two different super-increasing sequences of length $k$ to generate two different public keys. Therefore, using any public key of length $k$ or two of them of length $2 k$ along with the ciphertext will not help the eavesdropper, to recover the plaintext.

Also, Shamir's attack, which breaks the standard cryptosystem [4]-[6], cannot be a serious risk on the proposed cryptosystem. Since it uses two different public keys based on the Legendre Symbol, then knowing the size of $q_{i}$, where $1 \leq q_{i} \leq n_{1}$ and $1 \leq q_{i} \leq n_{2}$, by the eavesdropper, does not help him to know the two different private keys. That is, the elements of the two super-increasing sequences will always be hidden from eavesdropper.

Moreover, the comparison between the standard and the proposed cryptosystems is done to calculate the running time of encryption and decryption processes for different text's length in characters, see Table 3 and

Table 4 respectively. The calculations are performed by Maple on a computer with i3-2350M CPU @ 2.30 GHz 2.30 and 4GB RAM.

Table 3: The table shows CPU time for encryption processes of The Standard and Proposed Algorithms

| Text length in characters | Standard Cryptosystem | Proposed Cryptosystem |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 21121 | 594 ms | 2235 ms |
| 15809 | 406 ms | 1313 ms |
| 10463 | 297 ms | 875 ms |
| 8681 | 234 ms | 766 ms |
| 6091 | 172 ms | 516 ms |
| 5059 | 140 ms | 437 ms |
| 4001 | 110 ms | 328 ms |
| 3109 | 94 ms | 250 ms |
| 2087 | 62 ms | 156 ms |
| 1093 | 47 ms | 94 ms |

Table 4: The table shows CPU time for decryption processes of The Standard and Proposed Algorithms

| Text length in characters | Standard Cryptosystem | Proposed Cryptosystem |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 21121 | 890 ms | 387112.4 ms |
| 15809 | 422 ms | 212412.4667 ms |
| 10463 | 297 ms | 86011.467 ms |
| 8681 | 250 ms | 57797 ms |
| 6091 | 156 ms | 31047 ms |
| 5059 | 141 ms | 18547 ms |
| 4001 | 125 ms | 11281 ms |
| 3109 | 94 ms | 6453 ms |
| 2087 | 78 ms | 2719 ms |
| 1093 | 47 ms | 750 ms |

Table 3 and Table 4 above are represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively. Figure 2 shows the encryption time of the proposed cryptosystem is higher than the encryption time of the standards cryptosystem, and it increases gradually with the increase of text length characters. However, it is clear to notice that the time difference between them is not that high regarding a big text length in characters. Therefore, the proposed cryptosystem has the advantage of being faster to encrypt data.


Figure 2: The figure shows the encryption time for both cryptosystems
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows the decryption time of the proposed cryptosystem is much higher than the decryption time of the standard cryptosystem.


Figure 3: The figure shows the decryption time for both cryptosystems
From the figures above, it can easily be seen that the encryption and decryption times for the proposed algorithm is higher than the encryption and decryption times for the standard algorithm. Significantly, the increase in time increases strongly the security in the proposed cryptosystem.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we have proposed an effective algorithm to improve the security of the knapsack cryptosystem. The improvement is based on using the combination of the standard knapsack cryptosystem with Legendre Symbol. Using Legendre Symbol, which is either 1 or -1 , provides the advantage of using two different processes to generate the keys. The results show remarkably that the proposed cryptosystem is secure against the LLL algorithm and Shamir's attacks. Moreover, we have found that the decryption time in the proposed cryptosystem is higher than the time in the standard cryptosystem. The higher decryption time using the two different private keys increases the time needed to break the system, and that leads to an increase in the security of the system. Thus, the proposed cryptosystem is highly secured and more efficient comparing to the standard cryptosystem. Though we have shown that our proposed cryptosystem is secure against some famous attacks, some possible attacks might exist that can break it. For further study, the security of the proposed cryptosystem can be discussed against any other possible attacks.

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