

## **The Indian Diplomacy: Face-to-Face with China**

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### **Abstract:**

China and India have had cultural and economic relations since ancient times. One of the most important trading routes between India and China, the Silk Road also helped spread Buddhism to East Asia. A China-led economic system in Asia would doom India's economic prospects, even if India realized it a little late. A forceful economic dissociation replaced a passive commercial disengagement from China after Beijing's Ladakh invasion. China's logic of strategic autonomy nudges India to search for strong security alliances with the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia today. India is looking for ways to work together to establish trustworthy global supply chains that aren't completely reliant on China. Any nation's policies must be drastically altered if its territorial integrity or economic success is in danger. The present paper aims to understand the background, present, and future assessment of India-China relations in various dimensions. The paper concludes that the bottom line for the Partnership is quite clear; a peaceful border must prevail if progress accomplished over the previous three decades is to be preserved. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish between the boundary and the future of relationships. The Asian century will be decided by India and China's ability to find a solution to their differences.

**Keywords:** Asian Century, Diplomacy, Geo-political rivalry, Partnership.

### **Background:**

The relationship between India and China has had a lot of highs and lows throughout the years. Throughout India's history, the nation has always seen China as a friendly neighbour and a civilization with whom it aspired to maintain cordial ties on the cultural and commercial fronts. China and India have had cultural and economic relations since ancient times. One of the most important trading routes between India and China, the Silk Road also helped spread Buddhism to East Asia. British occupation of India and China during World War II was critical in slowing down Imperial Japan's advance <sup>[1]</sup>.

The British were forced to intervene in Central Asia and other regions of India because of events in the region. British officials considered the military conquest of Kashmir after the mutiny of 1857. Still, they pushed the Maharaja of Kashmir into a deal with the British government to keep Russia out of Central Asia by bringing Chitral and Yasin under his authority as a deterrent. Major John Biddulph, the first Political Agent of the Gilgit Agency, was appointed in 1877. As Afghan influence in Chitral increased, and Russian military activity increased in Central Asia, the Agent was re-appointed in 1889. He was removed in 1881 <sup>[2]</sup>.

Concerns over Russian involvement in Northern Kashmir heightened British fears, and the Maharaja was compelled on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 1935, to sign a 60-year lease with the British for the Gilgit agency. Waziristan province, beyond the Indus River's right bank, was given to the Viceroy of Gilgit by an agreement signed by both parties. Although Gilgit was part of the Maharaja's realm, it was effectively ruled by British officials from 1935 until 1947 due to British coercion. This demonstrates that the British had no fear or anxiety about the Chinese at the time. I would argue that China wasn't seen as an aggressor or an expansionist nation when it happened. That is correct. How do we know that this mountainous region of our nation (now occupied by Pakistan) is so desirable or strategically important? The Biafo Glacier, Baltoro Glacier, and Batura Glacier are three of the world's longest glaciers that aren't in the Polar Regions. High-altitude lakes may be found in the area. All of Pakistan's freshwater comes from or passes through this area. At an elevation of 4,115 meters above sea level, the Deosai Plains are the world's second-highest plateau. They occupy over 5,000 square kilometers and are snow-covered from September to May. There is an all-weather road between Deosai and Kargil, connecting the villages <sup>[3]</sup>.

Regarding Pakistan's geo-political interests, the Karakoram highway, which connects China to the country and purportedly produces billions of dollars in commerce for Pakistan, has made the region even more important.

#### **After India's Independence from Britain:**

This was the backdrop against which the newly constituted nation-states of India and China arose at the end of the 1940s, leaving decades of lengthy conflict and struggle in their wake. Governing and developing these vast, mostly rural populations and the accompanying pervasive poverty and the economy's sparse and undeveloped industrial sector was an uphill battle. Both nations had many of the same characteristics as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society with a history of border issues and territorial collapse.

India's first Prime Minister, Pt Jawaharlal Nehru, argued that as friendly nations surrounded the country, his administration didn't need to focus on protecting the country and its borders from foreign attacks at the time of independence. He says, "No nation in the world today can be described as unfriendly or antagonistic to the United States, and I believe this is true." However, Pt Nehru could not even imagine a "military assault from the Chinese side, whether in peace or war" from China. At the time, the government believed that having a friendly China was the best way to safeguard the boundary. "The Government believes that the best approach to defend that boundary is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China," V. Keshkar, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, said in the Lok Sabha on March 28<sup>th</sup>, 1951<sup>[4]</sup>. If one of our border countries becomes unfriendly, it is apparent that such a large and difficult border cannot be adequately secured.

The greatest approach to protecting our nation is to have a positive relationship with the Chinese government and the Tibetan people. Because of this, Indian officials could not strengthen the security and defence of the country's foreign boundaries. In one sense, this was the relationship between India and China.

In the recent past, there was some optimism that the World War II events might bring together the two peoples who had virtually forgotten their shared history, as described by the historian PC Bagchi. Chairman Mao told the Indian Ambassador in 1950 of four common sayings that Chinese who do well in this lifetime would be reborn in India in the next, which the Chinese elite were well-versed in. The notion of the Western Heavens, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, and the reputation of Xuan Zang's journey to the West was deeply ingrained in Chinese culture. The idea that India's social structure was intrinsically broken and deficient in societal cohesiveness had also formed at the time <sup>[5]</sup>. The Chinese Nationalists saw India agree with Western liberalism, naïve to its own emulation of other ideas.

People from all areas of life in both countries mingled passionately in the 1950s. To learn from one other's experiences; they were regular visitors to each other's countries. It will be 70 years since China and India first established diplomatic ties on April 1, 2020. The China People's Republic of China became the first non-Soviet bloc nation to establish diplomatic relations with India. Looking back over the last 70 years, ties between China and India have progressed despite challenges and followed an unusual growth path.

Anti-colonial sentiments did play a role in the Chinese leadership of that era, strongly advocating and working tirelessly for Indian independence. Their relationship with the British was severely harmed. As a result, particularly that of Winston Churchill in particular. This attachment was heightened by India's position as a supply lifeline through the Himalayas during the Second World War, although this feature faded in significance after 1949.

In October 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited China. When China and India first established diplomatic ties in the 1950s, the older generation of leaders took a historic decision to fight for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The phrase "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers) reverberated in our two nations.

At the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia (1955), both countries advocated for the Bandung Spirit of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation to decolonize Asia and Africa and create a Nonaligned Movement as the third way between the two blocs of superpowers. 29 countries attended the conference. Photographs showing the leaders of the two countries meeting in the 1950s show a strong camaraderie. In the end, it was an arrangement that favoured China, the more diplomatically isolated of the two nations, best. India firmly believed in the period of connections, notwithstanding the developing border divisions <sup>[6]</sup>. Tensions were developing behind the scenes as the Nations established contacts with other nations. The Chinese leadership was driven by a Sino-Soviet rivalry in a sense that only Communists could understand. When all of these difficulties came to a peak at once, the period came to an end.

After Jaitley's resignation as Finance Minister, he mentioned Nehru's letter (dated August 2, 1955), in which he discussed informal UN Security Council proposals made to India (UNSC). At the time, China was also vying for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. Pandit Nehru was clear that India deserved one but would not accept it at China's price. India's case could be examined independently, Nehru said, since China is a great nation and deserves its seat in the UNSC. Nehru saw China's exclusion from the United Nations as a major concern that may again lead to the breakdown of the UN and the beginning of conflicts. According to him, in 1953, the UN had made the same error that

caused the downfall of the League of Nations by failing to recognize China. As Harder points out, he also believed that a more socially and economically integrated China would lessen the likelihood of war. It was not Nehru's attempts to bring China into globalization that prevented the. Indian-Chinese conflict of 1962<sup>[7]</sup>.

The history of the war obscures our awareness of this dynamic time they fought in 1962. Bonhomie was quickly forgotten in the years that followed. After India's loss in World War II, the country developed a long-lasting aversion to all things Chinese and increased its ties with the USSR. This means shifting China's focus to Pakistan and erasing any mention of India from popular awareness. Due to 1962's influence on the academic community, there was an overwhelming focus on diplomacy and political history in academic circles. Misunderstanding in the 1950s, China and India have become used to each other's presence in the global community. China and India have steadily improved since they were re-established as ambassadors. A strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity was developed in the 1980s due to the two parties' agreement to resolve the border matter peacefully via friendly conversation. For example, China's ill-advised invasion of Vietnam in 1979, its ill-advised incursions into Sikkim in 1975, and the significant defeats in its invasions into Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh in 1986, and the Doklam in 2017 have shown that China's Army is not unbeatable<sup>[8]</sup>.

In 2020, the Chinese refused to reveal how many Chinese soldiers were killed in the Galwan mission. However, according to well-regarded western publications, 43 Chinese troops were killed throughout the conflict. In the wake of the brutal murder of their unarmed countrymen, the Indian Army retaliated boldly, decisive, and successfully, which the Chinese must now grasp.

### **Current Status:**

The "peaceful rise" of China has come to fruition. When "rising" is achieved, "peaceful" is the obvious victim. Hu Jintao was the author of this theory, but Deng Xiaoping was the leader who most exemplified it. Convinced that an aggressive China would never achieve superpower status or attempt to establish itself as a global hegemony, he gave the world his word that it would not do so. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly on April 10, 1974, Deng Xiaoping said, "A superpower is an imperialist nation which everywhere exposes other countries to its aggression; meddling, control. Subversion or pillage and aims for global hegemony" "China would never pursue hegemony," he assured Premier Wen Jiabao ahead of his April 2011 trip to Indonesia and Malaysia<sup>[9]</sup>. Even worse than hegemony, China has become something far worse than a hegemonic power. It has transformed into a savage bully hell-bent on asserting its authority by any means necessary. It has shown itself to the world. The Asian giant's former leaders may have sought to ease the anxieties of those concerned about its re-emergence from centuries of stagnation. Doubts about Xi Jinping, on the other hand, maybe put to rest once and for all. Xi Jinping's single-minded quest to create China as the world's most powerful nation can no longer be concealed.

In 2009, when it all started, it was assumed China's present ascent would halt in the global financial crisis, a shift in the U.S. It was no longer essential to conceal the administration's actions or the war's repercussions in Iraq. With the election of Xi Jinping to China's

presidency at the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 2012, China's ties with India and the rest of the globe entered a new era<sup>[10]</sup>.

The Dragon has amassed a combination of military might and financial muscle to accomplish its goals. How can the world, particularly nations like India, get out of this predicament? The third kind of power that China lacks is respect, credibility, and socio-cultural appeal. Soft power is as important as military and economic might in maintaining dominance and stifling opposition. This is a good thing for the people that live there. Chinese citizens, on the other hand, are ecstatic about the situation. Hong Kong's security rules were changed, and a gloomy atmosphere was cast over the city. The new legislation has repealed the 'one country, two systems' transfer deal with the United Kingdom. Also, the people of Taiwan would rather avoid becoming a part of the current Chinese political structure. About 100 households with multimillion-dollar fortunes have already left China for a better life elsewhere. Restrictions on cash withdrawals from Chinese banks have sparked fears among China's wealthy that their hard-earned money is no longer secure in the country. China's handling of the Wuhan virus has sparked outrage throughout the globe. Any nation seeking to rise to the status of Superpower throughout history has shown this time and time again. Chinese power and prosperity have soared to unparalleled heights in the last century after centuries of relative stagnation<sup>[11]</sup>. China has been flexing its muscles and announcing its "Expansionist strategy" since Xi Jinping assumed total power.

Prime Minister Modi called out 'territorial expansionism' as the greatest danger facing mankind. He was pointing to China's arbitrary territorial claims on almost all of its neighbours, including Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and even Russia, where some Chinese are currently resurrecting claims to the Russian port of Vladivostok, which has been part of Russia since 1860. China's previous efforts to extend its borders across the western Pacific Ocean will now face stronger criticism from its neighbours.

China's expansionist agenda has used the Covid-19 Pandemic's strategic advantage. The Covid-19 virus slipped from the Wuhan Lab. The key issue is whether it escaped from the lab accidentally or on purpose. Following the appointment of President Xi Jinping, China's strategic interests have expanded to include Asia, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa. To achieve a major shift in the competitive landscape, strategic competitions make their own promises. Only strategic failure and strategic success may reduce its revolutionary essence. The concept of "focus strength against weakness" lies at the heart of strategic rivalry.

Similar to geopolitics and military strategy, there are extended periods of natural completeness interrupted by unexpected and substantial alterations in the relationship due to strategy. Even "though completion continues during peace," it follows the age-old cycle of conflict and peace. Regarding geo-political rivalry, maintaining a stable connection during good times is key to winning. If one understands this, it is simple to comprehend China's relationship with India. Unlike a dragon, it waits for its prey and then pounces. In this case, it is just concerned with its own self-interest<sup>[12]</sup>.

We can't have meaningful border talks unless China gives us its maps representing its vision of the LAC. It does this regularly, which might lead to tensions and conflict. Even if PMS Vajpayee and Wen Jia Bao accepted the basic principles for addressing issues in 2002, it has



no interest in meaningful dialogue on the border problem. India must be prepared for border tensions as long as this scenario persists. Despite the possibility of another flare-up, we must determine how we will deal with China on the three front's politics, diplomacy, and military action. Indian policies and capabilities are treated with contempt in Chinese media.

Regarding Pakistan, China's strategy is to keep India in check. It has also prompted Nepal's Prime Minister Oli to highlight the issue of Nepal's border with India. Since the 1950s, China and Pakistan have maintained a strong military, nuclear, and Economic Partnership. It has provided Pakistan with nuclear weapon concepts and plutonium facility development. In addition, China continues to provide Pakistan with fighter planes, tanks, missiles, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), howitzers, frigates, and submarines, among other weapons systems. Chinese backing for Pakistan in international arenas, such as the UN Security Council, has also been unprecedented. It is also directly negotiating with the Pakistani government by building roads, and hydroelectric projects in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Pakistan has become China's second line of defence against India due to this arrangement <sup>[13]</sup>.

Other examples include the BRI's \$62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China would be able to access the Persian Gulf through the Gwadar Port after massive infrastructure developments crossing via POK into Pakistan. Suppose Pakistan's economy doesn't develop much, which it can't under current conditions. In that case, the nation will become deeper in debt to China due to the project's exorbitant interest rates. This imaginary province has already been assigned the designation "24th" in the Chinese Federation. Islamabad authorized Chinese heavy trawlers to fish in Pakistan's Exclusive Economic Zone in the Arabian Sea, much to the annoyance of its fishermen, as recently shown <sup>[14]</sup>.

Increasingly, India is taking an active role in countering China's ascent. Strategic encirclement, commonly referred to as the string of pearls' theory by Indian policymakers, was always seen by Indian policymakers as an attempt to give the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) an edge in a possible confrontation and greater leverage in talks over disputes. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or One Belt, One Road (OBOR), is seen by India as a continuation of China's strategy to surround it <sup>[15]</sup>.

Similar attempts have been made in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bangladesh. Chinese policy in South and Southeast Asia has sought to develop a network of friendly governments that depend on it for assistance. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar have been the three closest neighbors of India during the 1990s and have received almost 60% of China's weaponry shipment.

For years, India's intermittent support for the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka harmed ties between the two countries and fostered a climate of distrust that Beijing has since exploited. The building of the Port of Hambantota was part of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Sri Lanka has to lease the port to China for 99 years because of Colombo's inability to pay back the high-interest rate of Chinese loans <sup>[16]</sup>.

Nepal has been a buffer between India, Tibet, and China for decades. Now, China is keeping an eye on the country. There are no closed borders between India and Nepal, making it the only one of India's neighbours where commerce and tourism are permitted. In addition, it has

posed security concerns. With any breach between New Delhi and Kathmandu's Maoist-led administration, Beijing has offered better trade and infrastructure development conditions. Bangladesh has the second-largest Chinese investment under BRI after Pakistan. Since New Delhi has a strong relationship with Dhaka, the country's security, particularly in the country's north-eastern regions, is dependent on Bangladesh. Bangladesh and Dhaka's border issue has been resolved by New Delhi's efforts to encourage commerce between India's North-Eastern states and Bangladesh and provide lines of credit for infrastructure.

From Hambantota in Sri Lanka to Gwadar and Jiwani in Pakistan, China has a network of bases and ports in the Indian Ocean. In addition to Pakistan, New Delhi is worried about prospective bases in the Maldives and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. To help its near neighbours in South Asia, India has increased the financial assistance it provides. As a result, it has re-established diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia and the Pacific nations.

Only since India's "Look East" strategy was implemented in the 1990s when it sought to strengthen commercial connections with Southeast Asia has made progress in economic cooperation. Only in the past decade has the relationship been enriched by the addition of security. Trade between India and the area is worth \$76 billion. The planned Regional, Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade deal has been rejected by India. It has strengthened connections with nations in South Asia to help them improve their defence capabilities and become more crucial allies <sup>[17]</sup>.

Defence cooperation and strategic partnership agreements were inked between India and Singapore in 2015. Since 2016, India has been training Vietnamese navy submariners at its naval training school after providing over \$500 million in credit to Vietnam to upgrade its armed forces. The two countries discussed the Akash and Brahmos surface-to-air missiles.

Both India and China rely heavily on the Straits of Malacca, which accounts for over 40% of India's commerce. As part of a May 2018 deal made between India and Indonesia, the latter has granted the former access to the strategically positioned island of Sabang near the tip of Sumatra and less than 300 miles from the Malacca Straits. Investing in the port and Sabang's commercial district will be a priority for India. The harbor will also be visited by Indian navy vessels <sup>[18]</sup>.

For example, in the Indian Ocean area, it has strengthened ties with nations such as the Maldives, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Seychelles and India struck an agreement in 2018 that will allow India to develop an airport and jetty for the Indian Navy in Assumption Islands over a twenty-year period. As a result of this arrangement, India acquired access to Oman's strategically positioned port of Duqm, situated on the country's southern coast. The Forum for India Pacific Islands Cooperation has been holding yearly conferences since 2014, either in India or within the region. India has contributed substantial support, including yearly grants-in-aid ranging from \$125,000 to \$200,000 for each of the fourteen Pacific Island Countries <sup>[19]</sup>.

Because of the vast disparity in economic size between China and India, the two countries do not view each other as equals. If Beijing wants to be taken seriously as a rival, India must increase its economic growth and modernize its military. With China's global pre-eminence on the rise, the United States and its major allies have taken an interest in India's rise over the past two decades as part of their strategic plans for dealing with it. Terrorism and China's

rising might are risks to an open and rule-based global order that they both see as a threat. The United States does not see India's immediate surroundings in the same light as India does. Pakistan could fill the void if the United States were to leave Afghanistan following the Taliban's agreement with the United States <sup>[20]</sup>. As a result, India could not access Central Asia, while China's regional influence would be further enhanced. The US wants India to actively check China's growing influence in Southeast and East Asia without recognizing its priorities in South and Central Asia. The US is more concerned about China's naval capability and the threat it might pose in the South China Sea Pacific region. As part of the China-Iran agreement, a major port development project on the Strait of Hormuz is expected to be included. With American sanctions on Iran still in place, India is worried that the deal will be signed before the Chabahar Port project can be completed. Indian defence and foreign ministers recently visited Iran to maintain and strengthen ties between the two countries. India is concerned about Chinese involvement in the Chabahar project in this West Asian country.

An agreement on exchanging goods and services between the militaries of India and Japan was signed on September 10, 2020. The agreement sets a framework for collaboration between the Indian and Japanese armed forces in supplying supplies and services when engaged in bilateral training activities, United Nations peacekeeping missions, and international humanitarian aid. As a result of the agreement, India and Japan's militaries would be able to work together more closely on military matters as part of their "Special Strategic and Global Partnership." India and the other members of the 'Quad' or Quadrilateral, a developing alliance comprising India, the United States, Japan, and Australia, have now agreed to share military supplies.

The obvious next question is, "How will we get the Dragon under control?" It is a depleting option to use military force to force them to pull back while diplomatic attempts to restore the status quo are ongoing and troops have been reinforced as deterrence. The question now is whether India must accept the status quo and wait for China to make further advances along the unresolved boundary. Maintaining peace and tranquility on the border without a boundary agreement or a clear definition of the LAC, as we have done for over three decades, appears to have no purpose but rather gives the enemy an advantage. Because of this, India must persuade China to negotiate a mutually acceptable border. Met with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Moscow on September 10<sup>th</sup>, after three rounds of virtual meetings on the border working mechanism failed to halt a series of provocative moves by the Chinese Army. <sup>[21]</sup>

Making China Sparely populated is a nice option but a challenging one. As noted by India's External Affairs Minister in his Book "The India Way Strategies for an Uncertain World," Quote "Regional connection" is another area where both nations would, on the surface, have similar interests but are coming to grips with negotiating conflicting perspectives. He observes India is "comfortable with the connectivity contributions" of organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), where China "has a prominent role," but less so with "unilateral firms." India's attitude in May 2017, when it was the only major country not to attend China's inaugural Belt and Road Forum and underlined the need for openness, transparency, and international rules,



“led the global discussion” on connectivity. “Since then,” he writes, “the global discourse on the connection has’ broadened, most of it in accord with India’s ideas.”

Because of the size of the Indian market and its potential in the coming years, India has a lot of leverage, which we should be willing to use to our advantage. However, to take advantage of this leverage, Indians, both individuals and businesses must be willing to accept a period of increased prices. Without a mutually agreeable border settlement and an end to these border incidents, business as usual will not be possible for China, and the Indian market will begin to shrink for them. The Chinese enjoy a significant competitive edge in terms of global supply networks. However, whatever they sell can and will be produced elsewhere. Most of the goods we import from China are manufactured in India. As in China, India’s production costs would decrease as more was produced there. In addition, the government should facilitate the flow of funds for expansion and provide technical support for testing, improving quality, and lowering production costs.

We need a more aggressive procurement strategy and early manufacturing in India in important sectors such as Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, where we rely heavily on China for inputs. Government buying of certain expensive, crucial, and critical goods like electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, some electronic devices, or any other commodities we have to rely on in China should stimulate private investment in manufacturing. In addition to providing land, infrastructure, and inexpensive power to cut manufacturing costs, this encouragement may also come in financial incentives. The same advantages might be made available to international firms coming out of China to encourage them to invest and manufacture in India. In India, we may set up our own supply chain <sup>[22]</sup>.

The government scrutinizes Chinese FDI for its impact on national security. Hacking is a possibility in the management of telecommunications and power grids. This is facilitated if the equipment supplier or systems provider wants to include vulnerability. In certain places, Chinese enterprises should not be allowed to participate until there is a border dispute resolution. According to reliable sources, hackers from China and Pakistan have made nearly one million attempts to compromise Indian systems. China’s successful investments in India may be severely impacted if the government does not act quickly.

### **Far In Advance:**

As originally alleged, every scenario points to the Wuhan virus being created in a laboratory rather than from wet markets. Even if we assume it began in Wuhan’s wet market, why would China let it spread inside Wuhan and then to the rest of the globe when it was discovered? This may have been prevented if any remedial steps had been implemented. Why didn’t anyone worldwide get a heads-up about the impending disaster? Why wasn’t the WHO informed of the fatal virus’s full information right away? China was given a clean bill of health by the World Health Organization (WHO) even though WHO accepted any information presented as fact. All this information points to the possibility that the virus was created in a lab and intentionally released. This could have been done without firing a single shot to bring down the global economy <sup>[23]</sup>.

The entire argument that may be made is as follows: Firstly, China does not care all that much for its people, and as a result, the authoritarian regime does not mind sacrificing part of

the population. Examples include atrocities against Uyghur's in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, such as the Tiananmen Square massacre. Secondly, the date was chosen when the Trade War between the United States and China was at its peak, and China's economy was beginning to feel the strain. Third, China and India (the country that could put China on the defensive) were on the rise, with China doing so faster. Fourth, China was the primary source of the global supply network, and it could influence any country's development by manipulating that supply chain. Fifth, the timing of the spreading of the Wuhan virus' at its pinnacle coincided with the fact that the United States would be occupied with its presidential election and would not be able to have much influence on global problems to resist China's activities. Sixth, the mid-powers (Russia, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and India) are too preoccupied with their own economic and geo-political fears to offer the collective leadership required to supplant a world dominated primarily by superpower interests <sup>[24]</sup>. However, America's obsession with its internal fault lines provides every despot in the world with the opportunity to spread chaos while Uncle Sam is away. Seventh, this would allow Xi Jinping to show his muscles and establish his expansionist program. Eighthly, Europe became more fractured after Britain's withdrawal from the EU. This is precisely what is taking place at the present moment in time.

There has never been a better time for China to rise to global power status. China's ruthless and cunning behaviour must be countered globally by economically and diplomatically isolating the country. All countries must band together diplomatically to keep China from becoming a global power. Leading the way should be India and other global powers. Today's self-reliance is not a retreat from the world but an effort to increase India's economic contribution to the global economy. Ultimately, it's all about empowering India and quickly achieving its full economic potential. "Self-reliance" becomes "strategic autonomy" when applied to foreign policy. Determining how the world views China depends on China's actions during times of crisis, and they did bring up many of the risks inherent in the current global economy. Many countries, including India, have now adopted a policy of chaining together businesses. Chinese trade practices have sparked a growing international outcry. As a result, there have been calls for a significant shift away from China's dominance in global economics <sup>[25]</sup>.

A China-led economic system in Asia would doom India's economic prospects, even if India realized it a little late. A forceful economic dissociation replaced a passive commercial disengagement from China after Beijing's Ladakh invasion. China's logic of strategic autonomy nudges India to search for strong security alliances with the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia today. With a wide range of countries, India is looking for ways to work together to establish trustworthy global supply chains that aren't completely reliant on China. Any nation's policies must be drastically altered if its territorial integrity or economic success is in danger. According to S Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister of India, certain problems may be amenable to an early settlement, while others may not <sup>[26]</sup>. When managing a more powerful neighbour, India must grasp that this quest for balance is never-ending. This is the issue that India now confronts.

Currently, the bottom line for the Partnership is quite clear; a peaceful border must prevail if progress accomplished over the previous three decades is to be preserved. As a result, it is

impossible to distinguish between the boundary and the future of relationships. The Asian century will be decided by India and China's ability to find a solution to their differences. Indian diplomacy should concentrate on addressing the complicated issue of two neighbouring civilizations emerging simultaneously, making the situation even more difficult.

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